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This paper analyses the impact of direct democracy and local autonomy on tax morale and the size of 
the shadow economy. We use two different data sets on tax morale at the individual level (World 
Values Survey and International Social Survey Programme) and the macro data of the size of the 
shadow economy to systematically analyse the effects of institutions in Switzerland, a country where 
participation rights and the degree of federalism vary across different cantons. The findings suggest 
that direct democratic rights and local autonomy, have a significantly positive effect on tax morale and 
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1. Introduction 
 
Why do people pay taxes? This question has attracted increased attention in the tax 
compliance literature over the last few years. It can be supposed that nobody likes to pay 
taxes.  One  possibility  is  to  “enforce”  people  to  pay  their  taxes  establishing  a  deterrence 
policy.  In  line  with  the  economic-of-crime  approach  based  on  the  expected  utility 
maximisation calculus, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented a formal model with the 
insight that the extent of tax evasion is negatively￿correlated with the probability of detection 
and the degree of punishment. However, this pathbreaking model has been criticised by many 
authors (see, e.g., Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992; Frey and 
Feld, 2002). A main point, which is connected to the empirical and experimental findings, is 
that these deterrence models predict too little tax evasion. In many countries the level of 
deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance. Furthermore, there is a big 
gap between the amount of risk aversion that is required to guarantee such a compliance and 
the effectively reported degree of risk aversion. For the United States, the estimated Arrow-
Pratt measure of risk aversion is between one and two, but only a value of 30 would explain 
the observed compliance rate (see Graetz and Wilde, 1985, Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 
1992). Similarly, in Switzerland the relative risk aversion varies between 1 and 2, but a value 
of 30.75 would be necessary to reach the observed level of tax compliance of 76.52 percent  
(see Frey and Feld, 2002). Furthermore, tax compliance experiments mostly report a higher 
level of income declaration than the expected utility model would predict (for a survey see 
Torgler, 2002a).  
To  resolve  this  puzzle  of  tax  compliance,  many  researchers  have  argued  that  tax 
morale
1 can help explain the high degree of tax compliance (for empirical and experimental 
papers see, e.g., Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; Lewis, 1982; Roth, Scholz and Witte, 1989; 
Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992, 1999; Pommerehne, Hart and Frey, 1994; Frey, 1997, 
2003; Frey and Feld, 2002; Feld and Tyran, 2002; for a survey see Torgler, 2001). Erard and 
Feinstein (1994) in their theoretical paper stress the relevance of integrating moral sentiments 
into  the  models  to  provide  a  reasonable  explanation  of  actual  compliance  behaviour. 
Moreover, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) point out in their tax compliance survey that 
                                                 
1 First important findings in the tax morale literature date from the 60s and 70s by German scholars around 
Günter Schmölders (1951/1952, 1960, 1962, 1970) known as the ‘Cologne school of tax psychology’. They have 
emphasised that economic phenomena should not only be analysed from the traditional point of view. They saw 
tax morale as an attitude regarding tax (non-) compliance (see, e.g., Schmölders, 1960).  
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“adding  moral  and  social  dynamics  to  models  of  tax  compliance  is  as  yet  a  largely 
undeveloped area of research” (p. 852). Many researchers stress that a considerable portion of 
taxpayers are always honest. Some taxpayers are “simply predisposed not to evade” (Long 
and Swinger, 1991, p. 130) and thus do not even search for ways to cheat at taxes (see Frey, 
1999; Torgler, 2003a). More and more papers go beyond treating tax morale as a black box, a 
residuum, analysing which factors shape or maintain tax morale (for an overview see Torgler 
2007). The propose of the first part of this paper is to investigate in detail the impact of direct 
democracy and local autonomy on tax morale.  
  The second part of the paper explores the same question but using the size of the 
shadow economy instead of tax morale.  
The purpose of this paper is to fill out this gap identifying which factors have an 
impact on tax morale. It can be supposed that the extent of tax morale depends on the type of 
constitution. In general, there are not many studies which systematically analyse the influence 
of institutions on tax morale or tax compliance. Thus, we are going to analyse if institutions as 
direct democracy and federalism have an influence on tax morale, controlling for additional 
variables.  It  is  essential  to  analyse  under  which  institutional  conditions  citizens  are  more 
willing  to  pay  their  taxes.  For  this,  the  study  analyses  a  cross-section  of  individuals 
throughout  Switzerland  using  the  World  Values  Survey  (WVS)  data  1995-1997  and  the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data set  “Religion II”. Switzerland is chosen 
because it allows to observe the influence of institutional factors as direct democracy (via 
initiatives and referenda) and federalism (local autonomy). In Switzerland, there are various 
cantons with different degrees of political participation possibilities and fiscal decentralisation 
(see Table A1 in the Appendix).  
We can observe that economists show an increasing interest in survey analyses (see, 
e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002, Knack and Keefer 1997, Slemrod 2003). The Swiss WVS survey 
has been conducted in 1996 and the ISSP survey in 1999. Both data sets allow us to control 
for  many  factors  that  are  unrelated  to  institutional  variables.  Working  with  two  data  sets 
allows to check the robustness of our main variables. The findings suggest that institutional 
factors in the form of direct democratic participation rights and federalism raise tax morale. 
Furthermore, trust in government and trust in the court and the legal system have a positive 
effect  on  tax  morale.  In  Section  2  theoretical  considerations  on  tax  morale  and  previous 
empirical studies are presented focusing on direct democracy, local autonomy, and trust in 
institutions.  Section  3  presents  the  empirical  findings  and  Section  4  finishes  with  some 
concluding remarks.   4
2. Theoretical considerations  
 
2.1. Political participation 
Tax morale might depend on the type of institutional settings. Institutions that respect the 
preferences of the citizens will have more support by the people than a state that acts as a 
Leviathan (see Prinz, 2002). Levi (1988) points out that a possibility to create or maintain 
compliance is to provide reassurance by the government. A government that precommits itself 
with direct democratic rules imposes itself restraints on its own power and thus sends a signal 
that taxpayers are seen as responsible persons. Furthermore, direct democratic rules signalise 
that citizens are not ignorant or uncomprehending voters, which might create or maintain a 
certain social capital stock. The government signalises thus that taxpayers’ preferences are 
taken into account in the political process. Estimating a cross section/time series multiple 
regression  using  Swiss  data,  Pommerehne  and  Weck-Hannemann  (1996)  found  that  in 
cantons with a high degree of direct political control tax evasion is – ceteris paribus – about 
SFr 1500 lower as compared to the average of the cantons without such direct influence.  Feld 
and Frey (2002b) analysed how tax authorities treat taxpayers in Switzerland and found that  
tax authorities of cantons with more direct participation rights, compared to cantons with less 
direct democracy, treat taxpayers more respectfully and are less suspicious if taxpayers report 
too low incomes. On the other hand, not submitted tax declarations are more heavily fined. 
Looking  at  the  experimental  evidence.  Looking  at  the  experimental  evidence,  Alm, 
McClelland  and  Schulze  (1999),  Feld  and  Tyran  (2002)  and  Torgler,  Schaltegger  and 
Schaffner (2003) found that voting on tax issues has a positive effect on tax compliance.  
The more taxpayers can participate in political decision making by popular rights, the 
more the tax contract is based on trust and the higher is tax morale. Taxpayers are treated as 
“citizens” with extensive rights and obligations (Frey, 2003). They are in the position to better 
monitor and control politicians via referenda. Furthermore, they can set rules via initiative and 
are thus able to renegotiate the tax contract with the government influencing, e.g., the tax laws 
and the tax rates, which enhances civic virtue. Thus, the possibility for taxpayers to vote on 
fiscal issues positively influences tax morale. Being involved in the political decision process 
enhances taxpayers’ sense of civic duty (Feld and Frey, 2002a) and thus tax morale. The 
instrument  of  direct  democracy  helps  spend  taxes  according  to  their  preferences,  the 
motivation to contribute paying their taxes increases. Thus, the following hypothesis can be 
developed:    5
 
Hypothesis 1: The more extensive the citizens’ direct political participation possibilities, the 
higher the intrinsic motivation to comply in the form of tax morale 
 
2.2. Tax morale and trust in the government, the court and the legal system 
  
In a general way, it can be argued that positive actions by the state are intended to 
increase taxpayers’ positive attitudes and commitment to the tax system and tax-payment and 
thus  compliant  behaviour  (e.g.,  Smith,  1992;  Smith  and  Stalans,  1991).  If  the  state  acts 
trustworthily, taxpayers might be more willing to comply with the taxes. On the other hand, 
perceived unfairness increases the incentive to act against the tax law as psychological costs 
are reduced. With data from Switzerland (Zurich), Kucher and Götte (1998) found that trust, 
measured as the ratio of concurrence between the city government’s recommendation for an 
issue  put  to  a  vote  and  the  actual  outcome  at  the  ballot,  significantly  raised  the  ratio  of 
submitted tax declarations between 1964 and 1996 
The  relationship  between  taxpayers  and  state  can  be  seen  as  a  relational  or 
psychological  contract,  which  involves  strong  emotional  ties  and  loyalties.  Such  a 
psychological  tax  contract  can  be  maintained  by  positive  actions.  Thus,  one  of  the  most 
important  social  psychological  reasons  for  expecting  co-operation  is  reciprocity  (see 
Gouldner,  1960;  Axelrod,  1984;  Cialdini,  1984;  Regan,  1971).  Trust  especially  plays  an 
important role where detection and punishment are stamped by high cost. Tax authority can 
not achieve total compliance; they would have to place a tax administrator under every bed. 
This might indicate that trust is an important institution which influences citizen’s incentive to 
commit  themselves  to  obedience.  And  this  trust  can  only  be  created  if  government’s 
commitment acts in line with citizens’ needs and desires (see Hardin, 1998). Not only trust in 
the government but also trust in the court and the legal system and thus the way how the 
relationship  between  the  state  and  its  citizens  is  established  might  have  an  effect  on  tax 
morale. The cost of tax raising and government running is lower if taxpayers are more willing 
to pay their taxes voluntarily (Slemrod, 2003).  
In this light, the following hypothesis is going to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more extensive the citizens’ trust in the government and the legal system, 
the higher the intrinsic motivation to comply in the form of tax morale.    6
Frey and Feld (2002) argue that tax morale is supported or even raised when tax officials treat 
taxpayers with respect and on the other hand is reduced when the administration considers 
taxpayers  as  individuals  who  have  to  be  forced  to  pay  the  taxes:  “The  feeling  of  being 
controlled in a negative way, and being suspected of tax cheating, tends to crowd out the 
intrinsic motivation to act as an honourable taxpayer and, as a consequence, tax morale will 
fall. In contrast, if the tax official makes an effort to find out the reason for the error by 
contacting the taxpayer in an informal way (e.g. by phoning him or her), the taxpayer will 
appreciate this respectful treatment and tax morale will be upheld”(p. 12).  
They divide respectful treatment into two components (p. 5): (i) transparent and clear 
procedure by the tax administration, (ii) as a direct personal component, how the taxpayers’ 
character is respected by tax administrators. Their empirical analysis shows that a respectful 
treatment of taxpayers by the tax administration reduces tax evasion.  
 
2.3. Tax morale and decentralisation 
 
A second institution is federalism. Small structures have the advantage that citizens’ 
preferences can be met better. There is an intensive every-day interaction between taxpayers 
and local politicians and bureaucrats. This closeness between taxpayers, the tax administration 
and  the  local  government  may  induce  trust  and  thus  enhance  tax  morale.  Politicians  and 
members  of  the  administration  are  better  informed  about  the  preferences  of  the  local 
population. Furthermore, if politicians are elected at the local level, they have an incentive to 
put citizens’ preferences into account (see Frey and Eichenberger, 1999) and thus to spend the 
tax revenues according to their preferences. Decentralisation moves the government closer to 
the people. Many economists point out the relevance of giving sub-national governments the 
taxing  power  (see,  e.g.,  Bahl,  1999).  The  strength  of  decentralised  systems  is  a  better 
transparency of this input-output relationship. The tax system must be visible to the local 
taxpayers. The income tax is a good instrument for a local structure. It is easy to administrate 
and always under individuals’ test, who have the opportunity to use the instruments of exit 
and voice (see Hirschman, 1970). The mechanism of entry and exit in federal states provides a 
strong incentive to produce public services in accordance to taxpayers’ preferences. Thus, the 
third hypothesis states:  
   7
Hypothesis 3: The more extensive the local autonomy, the higher the intrinsic motivation to 




3. Empirical results 
 
3.1. Model 
In order to examine our hypotheses derived in section 2, the following estimation equation is 
postulated: 
 
  i C i i i i c c i INST TR CTL y t f p TM ε β β β β β β β β + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  
 
where TMi denotes the individual degree of tax morale. The general question to assess the 
level of tax morale from the World Values Survey in Switzerland for the year 1996 is: 
 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: (...) Cheating on tax if you have 
the chance (% “never justified” – code 1 from a ten-point scale where 1=never and 
10=always). 
 
The dependent variable TAX MORALE
3 is developed by recoding the ten-point scale into a 
four-point scale, with the value 4 standing for “never justifiable”. The value one is an 
aggregation of the last 7 points, which were rarely chosen.  
Similarly, the question in the ISSP (year 1999) was: 
 
  Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or her 
income in order to pay less income taxes? (1= not wrong, 2= a bit wrong, 3= wrong,  
4=seriously wrong). 
 
                                                 
2  However,  it  should  be  noticed  that  in  Switzerland  local  authorities  administer  the  largest  part  of  income 
taxpayers. The cantonal level, which is the focus in this paper, copes only a smaller share of taxpayers directly. 
3 The way tax morale is defined here can be criticised as only one question is used to assess tax morale. On the 
other hand, such a definition reduces the problems which are connected to an index.    8
Thus, in both data sets we have the same tax morale scale. The independent variables are 
specified as follows: 
 
1.  pc:  As an approximation for the probability of detection, the number of tax auditors 
per taxpayer (in ‰) in each canton c is used. 
2.  fc: The penalty tax rate is approximated by the standard legal fine as a multiple of the 
evaded tax amount (in percent)
 in a canton c
4.  
3.  ti: Individual tax rate. 
4.  yi: The individual income class of a taxpayer (see Appendix) 
5.  CTLi: a panel of control variables at the individual level covering: age, gender, education, 
marital status, employment status. 
6.  TRi : measures in the WVS data set the trust in the government
5 and in the ISSP data set the 
confidence in the courts and the legal system
6.  
7.  INSTc: Institutional factors at the cantonal level c. For the degree of direct democracy the six 
point scale index developed by Stutzer (1999) and applied, e.g., by Frey and Stutzer (2000, 
2002), Frey and Feld (2002), Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) has been used. The index reflects 
the extent of direct democratic participation (1= lowest and 6 highest degree of participation) 
at the cantonal level.
7 As indexes do not tell as much as a single instrument, we are going to 
measure the degree of direct democratic participation with a dummy on legislative referendum 
and degree of signature requirements for legislative initiatives. Local autonomy is measured 
with an index developed by Ladner (1994) based on survey results where chief local 
administrators in 1865 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they perceive their local 
autonomy on a 10 point scale.  (1= no autonomy, 10 = very high communal autonomy, see 
Appendix Table A2). 
 
 
                                                 
4 The information about the probability of detection and the fine for tax evasion has been collected by Lars P. 
Feld and Bruno S. Frey with a questionnaire. The following contributions are based upon this data set: Feld and 
Frey (2002a), (2002b) and Frey and Feld (2002).  
5 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in your capital: is it a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all). 
6 How much confidence do you have in courts and the legal system (5=complete confidence to 1=no confidence 
at all). 
7 The index includes the four legal instruments : the popular initiative to change the canton’s constitution, the 
popular initiative to change the canton’s law, the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new law or 
changing of a law and the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. The index is 
based on the degree of restrictions in form of the necessary signatures to use an instrument, the time span to 
collect the signatures and the level of new expenditure which allows to use the financial referendum (for a 
detailed discussion see Stutzer, 1999).    9
But  how  can  tax  morale  be  defined?  In  this  paper  we  define  tax  morale  as  the  intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes. It is the willingness to pay taxes by the individuals. Contrary to tax 
evasion, tax morale does not measure individual’s behaviour, but individuals’ attitude. It can 
be seen as the moral obligation to pay taxes, the belief in contributing to the society by paying 
taxes. On the other hand, it also catches the moral regret or guilt over cheating on taxes. If a 
taxpayer’s regret or feeling of guilt is strong, she/he will be more willing to pay the taxes. The 
approximation of tax morale in our empirical analysis is the justifiability of cheating on taxes 
and the belief to which extent it is wrong not to report all of the income in order to pay less 
income taxes. Based on this definition it should be noted that such measurements are not free 
of biases. It could be that a taxpayer who has incurred in tax evasion in the past will tend to 
excuse this kind of behaviour reporting a higher tax morale. 
The  economics-of-crime  approach  would  predict  that  the  extent  of  tax  evasion  depends 
negatively on the probability of being caught and the size of punishment in case of being 
caught. Some empirical findings indicate that a higher probability of being caught discourages 
evasion (see, e.g., Crane and Nourzad, 1987; Witte and Woodbury, 1985; Dubin and Wilde, 
1988; Joulfaien and Rider, 1996). In experiments there is also the tendency that a higher audit 
rate  leads  to  more  compliance  (see,  e.g.,  Friedland  et  al.,  1978;  Beck  et  al.,  1991;  Alm, 
Jackson  and  McKee,  1992a,  1992b,  Alm,  Cronshaw,  and  McKee,  1993;  for  a  survey see 
Torgler, 2002a). However, the pooled cross section time series estimation for Swiss cantons 
over the years 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, and 1995 done by Frey and Feld (2002) using tax 
evasion as dependent variable indicates that the probability of detection has a theoretically 
unexpected  positive  sign  being  not  statistically  significant,  while  the  size  of  the  fine  is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Beron, Tauchen and Witte (1992) found with tax 
return data from 1969 a weak deterrent effect from audits on tax compliance. Pommerehne 
and Weck-Hannemann (1996) found that the coefficients of the probability of detection and 
the  penalty  tax  rate  have  a  negative  sign,  but  none  of  them  was  statistically  significant. 
Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian (2001) used a controlled field experiment in Minnesota to 
analyse taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit. While low and middle income 
taxpayers increased their reported tax between 1993 and 1994 relative to the control group, 
the reported income of high income taxpayers fell sharply in relation to the control group.  
  It is difficult to predict the effects of deterrence factors on tax morale. Deterrence 
imposed by the tax authority might crowd out taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to pay their 
taxes and thus crowd out tax morale. On the other hand, deterrence factors might prevent 
taxpayers with a low tax morale exploiting the more honest taxpayers. Tax morale is therefore   10
not  expected  to  be  crowded  out  if  the  honest  taxpayers  perceive  the  stricter  policy  to  be 
directed  against  dishonest  taxpayers.  Regulations  which  prevent  free  riding  by  others, 
reducing the possibility to escape from their tax payments may help preserve tax morale (see 
Frey, 1997).  
  The  effects  of  the  tax  rate  and  the  income  on  tax  evasion  are  difficult  to  assess 
theoretically. It depends on the individual’s risk preference and the progression of the income 
tax schedule (see Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998). A higher marginal tax rate makes tax 
evasion  marginally  more  profitable,  but  a  contrary  effect  works  depending  on  the  risk 
aversion  of  taxpayers.  The  results  are  influenced  by  the  tax  schedule  (proportional, 
progressive, regressive) (see Frey and Feld, 2002). Furthermore, the relationship between tax 
evasion  and  tax  rate  depends  also  on  the  penalty  structure.  In  case  the  penalties  are 
proportional  to  the  amount  of  evaded  income  and  taking  into  consideration  a  decreasing 
absolute  risk  aversion  and  constant  tax  rates  than  the  sign  is  ambiguous  (Allingham  and 
Sandmo, 1972). On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate will encourage individuals to 
declare more income, if fines are proportional to the amount of evaded taxes (Yitzhaki, 1974). 
  Regarding the control variables it might be worthwhile to point out that older people 
can be expected to have a higher tax morale than the younger. Over the years they have 
acquired  greater  social  stakes,  as  material  goods,  statuses,  a  stronger  dependency  on  the 
reactions from others (Tittle, 1980), as they mostly have lived for a certain time in the same 
place and thus are more attached to the community (see Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 
1996). In the tax compliance literature evidence concerning the variable gender indicates the 
tendency that men are less compliant than women (see, e.g., Vogel, 1974; Tittle, 1980, Spicer 
and Becker, 1980). Looking at the marital status it can be argued that married people might be 
more constrained by their social network and thus more compliant, but on the other hand in 
Switzerland they are taxed in a higher bracket than two separate incomes which might have a 
negative impact on tax morale. Better educated taxpayers are supposed to know more about 
tax law and fiscal connections and thus would be in a better position to assess the degree of 
compliance, being better aware of the benefits and services the state provides for the citizens 
from the revenues (see Lewis, 1982). On the other hand, they may be less compliant because 
they better understand the opportunities for evasion and avoidance and might be more critical 
about and better aware of how the state uses tax revenues. Self-employed persons do not per 
se have a lower tax morale than other taxpayers, but they have better possibilities to evade 
taxes. Most empirical results, which indicate that self-employed have a lower tax compliance, 
are from other countries than Switzerland, where labour income earners pay taxes at source.   11
3.2. Results 
 
3.2.1. Deterrence factors 
 
Our  estimations  start  with  analysing  the  effects  the  traditional  variables  of  an 
economics of crime approach have on tax morale. Thus, our first estimations are going to 
consider three basic variables of this approach: the fine rate of tax evasion, the probability of 
detection and the individual tax rate. Therefore, weighted least squares models and weighted 
ordered  probit  models  are  estimated  in  Table  1.  Some  groups  might  be  over-sampled.  A 
weighted variable helps to correct the samples and thus to reflect national distribution. The 
weighted ordered probit models help analyse the ranking information of the scaled dependent 
variable tax morale. As in the ordered probit estimation, the equation has a non-linear form; 
only the sign of the coefficient can be directly interpreted and not its size. Calculating the 
marginal effects is therefore a method to find the quantitative effect a variable has on tax 
morale. The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of taxpayers (or the probability 
of) belonging to a specific tax morale level, when the independent variable increases by one 
unit. In the weighted ordered probit estimation, only the marginal effects for the highest value 
“tax  evasion  is  never  justified”  (WVS  1996)  and  “seriously  wrong  not  to  report  all  the 
income” (ISSP 1999) are shown. 
Table  1  presents  the  results.  As  we  can  see  most  results  are  robust  regarding  the 
estimation methods. The weighted least squares estimations using tax morale as a cardinal 
variable  offer  qualitatively  quite  similar  results  as  the  weighted  ordered  probit  model. 
Looking at the variables FINE RATE, AUDIT PROBABILITY and INDIVIDUAL INCOME 
TAX RATE we observe similar values for both data sets. The results indicate that the basic 
tax evasion model does not perform in a satisfactory way. The coefficients are mostly not 
significant. Only in one estimation the coefficient of the variable AUDIT PROBABILITY is 
significant at the 10 percent level showing a positive sign. On the other hand, the coefficient 
of the variable FINE RATE is statistically not significant with a negative tendency. In further 
estimations  we  are  going  to  see  that  these  coefficients  are  often  not  significant.  In  those 
estimations  where  the  coefficient  is  significant,  we  find  a  tendency  for  a  higher  audit 
probability to be correlated with a higher tax morale, and a higher fine rate with a lower tax 
morale. One reason might be that stronger controls help to catch tax evaders and thus honest 
taxpayers perceive the audit probability to be directed against dishonest taxpayers. On the 
other hand, however, a higher fine rate might crowd out more the intrinsic motivation to   12
comply with taxes, as it is settled in the laws and more evident for the taxpayers, signalising 
thus stronger external interventions. 
Only in the weighted ordered probit estimation with the WVS data set the individual 
tax rate has a negative effect on tax morale, significant at the 10 percent level. The negative 
sign is consistent with many empirical papers analysing the correlation between tax rates and 
tax evasion (see, e.g., Clotfelter, 1983; Crane and Nourzad 1992). However, it should be 
noticed that Feinstein (1991) does not find a positive correlation between tax rates and non-
compliance, trying to better separate the effects of marginal tax rates from those of income. 
It is difficult to get a clear picture of the effects of the control variables on tax morale. 
There is the tendency that women have a higher tax morale than men. The marginal effects in 
the  WVS  survey  estimation  indicate  for  example  that  being  a  woman  rather  than  a  man 
increases  the  probability  of  a  person  stating  that  tax  evasion  is  never  justified  by  27.5 
percentage points. Furthermore, married people seem to have a higher tax morale than the 
reference group (singles). In the ISSP data set, which does not differentiate between married 
people and people living together, the coefficient is positive, but without being significant. A 
higher education correlates with a higher tax morale, at a statistically significant rate in the 
ISSP data set.  
Different results can be observed regarding the effects of income and the employment 
status on tax morale. Only the coefficients of the ISSP estimations are statistically significant 
indicating a positive correlation between tax morale and income. Part time employees have a 
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Table 1 Determinants of tax morale in Switzerland in 1996 and 1996  
￿
   World Value Survey 1996           ISSP 1999          
                       
Dependent Variable:  weighted   weighted        weighted   weighted     
Tax Morale  least squares  ordered probit      least squares  ordered probit   
Independent Variables  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.     Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
a) Deterrence Factors                       
FINE RATE  -0.001  -1.187 -0.001  -1.615 -0.001   -0.001  -0.682 -0.001  -0.834 0.000 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.001  1.121  0.002*  1.856  0.001    0.001  1.073  0.001  1.074  0.000 
b) Tax Rate                       
INDIVIDUAL INC. TAX RATE -0.008  -1.327 -0.009*  -1.916 -0.004   -0.019  -1.568 -0.022  -1.772 -0.006 
c) Demographic Factors                       
AGE 30-49  0.028  0.211  0.025  0.249  0.010    -0.041  -0.447 -0.032  -0.332 -0.009 
AGE 50-64  0.403**  2.553  0.396***  3.163  0.157    -0.020  -0.191 -0.020  -0.167 -0.006 
AGE 65+  0.348  1.380  0.347  1.554  0.138    0.013  0.082  -0.002  -0.011 -0.001 
WOMAN  0.284***  2.882  0.275***  3.397  0.109    0.064  0.930  0.082  1.066  0.024 
EDUCATION  0.013  0.510  0.013  0.617  0.005    0.033*  1.870  0.040**  2.042  0.012 
d) Marital Status                       
MARRIED  0.319**  2.296  0.317***  2.963  0.126    0.001  0.015  0.005  0.063  0.002 
LIVING TOGETHER  0.071  0.400  0.070  0.528  0.028             
DIVORCED  0.183  0.941  0.174  1.135  0.069    -0.292**  -2.189 -0.334**  -2.120 -0.098 
SEPARATED  0.292  0.819  0.190  0.693  0.075    0.158  0.844  0.232  1.290  0.068 
WIDOWED  0.013  0.059  -0.133  -0.736 -0.053   -0.021  -0.149 -0.026  -0.147 -0.008 
e) Economic Variable                       
INCOME  -0.007  -0.398 -0.007  -0.490 -0.003   0.000*  1.706  0.000*  1.853  0.000 
f) Employment Status                       
PART TIME EMPLOYED  0.286**  2.103  0.283***  2.581  0.112    -0.176*  -1.786 -0.225**  -2.046 -0.066 
LESS THAN PART TIME              0.047  0.351  0.038  0.253  0.011 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.150  0.865  0.139  0.934  0.055             
UNEMPLOYED  -0.051  -0.173 -0.047  -0.223 -0.019   -0.041  -0.167 -0.076  -0.270 -0.022 
AT HOME  0.237  1.488  0.240*  1.862  0.095    0.132  1.003  0.142  0.931  0.041 
STUDENT  0.030  0.125  0.012  0.066  0.005    0.177  1.285  0.228  1.627  0.066 
RETIRED  0.514**  2.288  0.590***  2.728  0.234    0.207  1.377  0.252  1.475  0.074 
OTHER  0.432  1.235  0.468  1.628  0.186             
SICK              0.244  1.003  0.245  0.483  0.071 
                       
Observations  922    922        1130    1130     
R-squared  0.114            0.034         
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000            0.000         
Prob(LM-statistic)        0.000                 0.000       
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, FULL 
TIME EMPLOYED. In the ISSP data married and people living together are added into one group. Furthermore, they include 
people working less than part time and sick persons, omitting instead self-employed persons. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 
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In general, the main finding in these estimations is the fact that the standard model of tax 
evasion does not work well. The findings do not indicate that coercion does not play any role, 
but it reduces the emphasis of the significance of such an instrument for resolving the social 
dilemma of tax payments. Monitoring and penalties for non-compliance might have the effect 
that  individuals  crowd  out  intrinsic  motivation  to  comply  with  taxes  (see  Frey,  1997). 
Empirical  findings  in  Switzerland  also  indicate  that  the  expected  utility  maximisation 
approach  does  not  work  well. The pooled cross section time series estimations for Swiss 
cantons over the years 1970, 1978, 1985, 1990, and 1995 done by Frey and Feld (2002), using 
tax evasion as a dependent variable, indicate that probability of detection has a positive sign 
being  statistically  significant  in  some  equations,  while  the  size  of  the  fine  is  statistically 
significant  with  a  negative  sign.  Torgler,  Schaltegger  and  Schaffner  (2003)  in  a  tax 
compliance experiment done in Switzerland and Costa Rica even found a negative effect of 
deterrence factors on tax compliance. 
These  findings  indicate  that  the  basic  evasion  model  has  to  be  extended  with 
additional factors. Thus, the paper analyses to which extent important insights can be obtained 
by  including  formal  and  informal  institutions  to  evaluate  what  shapes  tax  morale. 
Switzerland’s  constitution  combines  direct  democracy elements as initiative and referenda 
with  a  high  degree  of  federalism,  which  means  that  cantons  and  local  authorities  have 
extensive  competences.  The  degree  of  institutionalised  rights  of  political  participation 
strongly varies between the 26 Swiss cantons.  
 
3.2.2. Direct democratic participation rights and trust in the government and the legal system 
 
First,  we  are  going  to  analyse  the  effect  of  direct  democracy  and  trust  in  the 
government, the court and the legal system on tax morale
8. The degree of direct democratic 
participation rights of taxpayers is measured with an index developed by Stutzer (1999). The 
results for both data sets are presented in Table 2 and 3. The index of direct democratic rights 
has a highly significant positive effect on tax morale with high marginal effects. Thus, the 
first hypothesis cannot be rejected. Eq. 2a (Eq. 2b) indicates that an increase in the index of 
direct democracy by one point raises the share of persons indicating the highest tax morale by 
                                                 
8 It should be noticed that the Swiss World Value Survey was not random-random but quota-random, based on a 
random sample of communes and then on quotas in terms of sex, age, etc. in the selected communes. Thus, the 
smallest cantons are not necessarily represented (not represented are: Appenzell a. Rh., Glarus, Jura, Nidwalden, 
Uri, and Zug). On the other hand, the ISSP data set contains all 26 cantons.    15
6.4 (2.9) percentage points. Thus, the results show that the institution direct democracy raises 
individual’s tax morale
9.  
In a next step we are going to analyse whether trust in the government and the legal 
system have a positive effect on tax morale. The effects of trust on tax morale can be analysed 
on two different levels: i) at the constitutional level and ii) at the current politico-economic 
level. With the WVS question we focus more closely on the current politico-economic level. 
On the other hand with the ISSP data set we focus on how the relationship between the state 
and  its  citizens  is  established.  As  democracy  works  as  an  institution  that  enhances  the 
psychological  tax  contract  between  citizens  and  the  state  and  thus  induces  trust,  we  first 
analyse the trust variables in separate estimations (see Eq. 3a and 3b). The results indicate that 
hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected either. Both trust coefficients are highly significant showing a 
statistically significant positive effect on tax morale. An increase in the trust in government 
scale (trust in court and the legal system) by one unit increases the share of subjects indicating 
the highest tax morale by 8.9 (3.4) percentage points. To investigate whether the positive 
correlation between direct democracy and tax morale is largely driven by a higher trust, we 
include them together into the same equations (see Eq. 4a and 5b). Furthermore, in order to 
test for alternative explanations we include additional variables (religiosity and individuals’ 
financial  satisfaction  in  the  WVS  and  religiosity  in  the  ISSP  data  set).  Religiosity  might 
influence people’s habits and might be a restriction to engage in tax evasion. Kirchgässner 
(1999) argues that in the Northern States of Europe, in contrast to the majority of Catholic 
countries in the south, state and religious authority were held by one person. Offenses against 
the state were therefore also religious offenses and consequently components of a sin. Thus, 
traditionally,  people  in  Northern  States  have  a  stronger  restriction  to  evade  taxes  (for 
empirical evidence see Torgler, 2002b). As religious variable we take the variable frequency 
of  church  attendance  (CHURCH  ATTENDANCE).  This  approximately  shows  how  much 
time individuals devote to religion. It says more about behaviour than, e.g., religious attitudes. 
To the author’s knowledge there are only three papers which examine the effect of religiosity 
on tax cheating (Tittle, 1980; Grasmick et al., 1991; Torgler, 2002c). All three studies indicate 
that  religiosity  affects  the  degree  of  rule  breaking,  tax  compliance  and  tax  morale.  Our 
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findings in Table 2 and 3 are in line with these results, showing a positive correlation between 
tax morale and the degree of church attendance. 
 
Table 2 The effects of direct democracy and trust on tax morale (WVS 1996) 
￿
WVS 1996                            
weighted ordered probit                   
Dependent variable: tax morale    Eq. 2a      Eq.3a      Eq.4a   
                   
Variable  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
a) Deterrence Factors                   
FINE RATE  -0.002***  -2.591  -0.001  -0.001  -1.037  -0.098  -0.002**  -2.096  -0.001 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.001  0.809  0.000  0.002*  1.822  0.000  0.001  1.176  0.001 
b) Tax Rate                   
INDIVIDUAL INC. TAX RATE  -0.008  -1.544  -0.003  -0.008*  -1.691  0.001  -0.007  -1.404  -0.003 
c) Institutional Variable                   
DIRECT DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS  0.162***  4.517  0.064        0.184***  5.033  0.073 
d) Trust                    
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT        0.225***  5.214  0.089  0.170***  3.810  0.067 
e) Demographic Factors                   
AGE 30-49  0.055  0.562  0.022  0.038  0.372  0.015  0.014  0.137  0.006 
AGE 50-64  0.427***  3.440  0.170  0.407***  3.143  0.162  0.310**  2.355  0.123 
AGE 65+  0.385*  1.739  0.153  0.277  1.297  0.110  0.215  0.951  0.086 
WOMAN  0.286***  3.485  0.114  0.259***  3.117  0.103  0.261***  3.108  0.104 
EDUCATION  0.010  0.468  0.004  -0.009  -0.433  -0.004  -0.013  -0.595  -0.005 
f) Marital Status                   
MARRIED  0.320***  3.012  0.127  0.314***  2.784  0.125  0.346***  3.047  0.137 
LIVING TOGETHER  0.051  0.378  0.020  0.098  0.701  0.039  0.089  0.600  0.035 
DIVORCED  0.139  0.893  0.055  0.164  1.055  0.065  0.210  1.288  0.083 
SEPARATED  0.197  0.697  0.078  0.206  0.725  0.082  0.242  0.834  0.096 
WIDOWED  -0.140  -0.755  -0.056  -0.144  -0.807  -0.057  -0.139  -0.759  -0.055 
g) Economic Variable                   
INCOME  -0.014  -1.006  -0.006  -0.013  -0.861  -0.005  -0.026*  -1.666  -0.010 
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION              0.050***  2.894  0.020 
h) Employment Status                   
PART TIME EMPLOYED  0.276**  2.502  0.110  0.270**  2.377  0.107  0.238  2.090  0.094 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.160  1.060  0.064  0.102  0.701  0.041  0.139  0.921  0.055 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.061  -0.292  -0.024  -0.024  -0.108  -0.010  0.072  0.331  0.029 
AT HOME  0.244*  1.896  0.097  0.208  1.594  0.083  0.214*  1.658  0.085 
STUDENT  0.039  0.216  0.015  -0.084  -0.463  -0.033  -0.065  -0.336  -0.026 
RETIRED  0.582***  2.729  0.231  0.599***  2.933  0.238  0.503**  2.372  0.200 
OTHER  0.496*  1.755  0.197  0.549*  1.762  0.218  0.607  1.910  0.241 
i) Religiosity                   
CHURCH ATTENDANCE              0.078***  3.623  0.031 
                   
Observations  922      891      879     
Prob(LM-statistic)  0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, 
FULL TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = 
highest tax morale score (4). 
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Table 3 The effects of direct democracy and trust on tax morale (ISSP 1999) 
￿
ISSP 1999                            
weighted ordered probit                   
Dependent variable: tax morale    Eq. 2b 
    Eq.3b      Eq.4b   
                   
Variable  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
a) Deterrence Factors                   
FINE RATE  -0.001  -1.207  0.000  -0.001  -0.677  0.000  -0.001  -0.663  0.000 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.38E-03  0.418  0.000  0.001  0.677  0.000  -0.47E-04  -0.051  0.000 
b) Tax Rate                   
INDIVIDUAL INC. TAX RATE  -0.010  -0.779  -0.003  -0.021*  -1.681  -0.006  -0.010  -0.770  -0.003 
c) Institutional Variable                   
DIRECT DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS  0.100***  3.346  0.029        0.104***  3.410  0.030 
d) Trust                    
TRUST IN COURT AND LEGAL       0.116***  3.782  0.034  0.093***  2.936  0.027 
SYSTEM                   
e) Demographic Factors                   
AGE 30-49  -0.027  -0.287  -0.008  0.047  0.482  0.014  0.064  0.640  0.018 
AGE 50-64  -0.017  -0.145  -0.005  0.049  0.411  0.014  0.050  0.401  0.014 
AGE 65+  -0.008  -0.043  -0.002  0.053  0.270  0.016  0.005  0.027  0.002 
WOMAN  0.090  1.162  0.026  0.075  0.948  0.022  0.076  0.950  0.022 
EDUCATION  0.044**  2.273  0.013  0.034*  1.676  0.010  0.038*  1.861  0.011 
f) Marital Status                   
MARRIED/LIVING TOGETHER  0.011  0.131  0.003  -0.019  -0.237  -0.006  -0.061  -0.723  -0.018 
DIVORCED  -0.314*  -1.941  -0.091  -0.344*  -2.157  -0.100  -0.300*  -1.816  -0.087 
SEPARATED  0.236  1.307  0.069  0.193  1.063  0.057  0.178  0.961  0.051 
WIDOWED  -0.038  -0.221  -0.011  -0.029  -0.161  -0.008  -0.103  -0.565  -0.030 
g) Economic Variables                   
INCOME  0.23E-04  0.997  0.000  0.37E-04* 1.708  0.000  0.21E-04  0.957  0.000 
h) Employment Status                   
PART TIME EMPLOYED  -0.203*  -1.828  -0.059  -0.214  -1.902  -0.062  -0.172  -1.489  -0.050 
LESS THAN PART TIME  0.049  0.331  0.014  0.020  0.131  0.006  -0.002  -0.014  -0.001 
UNEMPLOYED  0.006  0.020  0.002  0.011  0.037  0.003  -0.039  -0.116  -0.011 
STUDENT  0.283**  2.020  0.082  0.255*  1.741  0.075  0.366**  2.457  0.106 
RETIRED  0.302*  1.751  0.088  0.257  1.453  0.075  0.319*  1.751  0.092 
AT HOME  0.172  1.130  0.050  0.142  0.917  0.042  0.151  0.952  0.044 
SICK  0.290  0.549  0.084  0.215  0.390  0.063  0.250  0.379  0.072 
i) Religiosity                   
CHURCH ATTENDANCE              0.085***  4.750  0.025 
                   
Observations  1130      1083      1068     
Prob(LM-statistic)  0.000                 0.000       
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, 
FULL TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = 





Financial dissatisfaction might negatively influence tax morale. Such dissatisfaction 
might  create  a  sense  of  distress,  especially  when  taxes  have  to  be  paid  and  there  is  a 
discrepancy between the actual and the aspired financial situation
10. Thus, taxes might be 
perceived as a strong restriction, which increases the incentives to reduce tax honesty. As the 
income variable is integrated into the equation, we can analyse the “stress” component of the 
financial  dissatisfaction.  The  result  in  Table  2  shows  that  an  increase  in  the  financial 
satisfaction level by one unit increases the share of individuals arguing that tax morale is 
never justifiable by 2 percentage points. The coefficients of the direct democracy and trust in 
government and trust in the court and the legal system remain statistically highly significant. 
In general, the main results remain robust. Thus, it can be concluded that both variables have 
a robust influence on tax morale. 
However, it can be argued that the index of direct democratic participation possibilities 
disregards substitutive and complementary relationships between the single components as it 
is a nonweighted composite index (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Furthermore, factors in closer 
relation to the taxation might have a stronger impact on tax morale than other factors. Thus, 
equations 8 to 11 evaluate each single component of the direct democratic participation index 
(see Table 4 and 5). For both data sets, all the coefficients for the single components are 
highly  significant  and  it  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  index  with  the  strongest  direct 
connection  to  taxes  (financial  referendum)  has  the  highest  coefficient  value  and  strongest 
marginal effects. An increase in the index of legislative financial referendum by one point 
raises the proportion of taxpayers with the highest tax morale by 6.2 (2.6) percentage points in 
the WVS (ISSP) data set.  
Including the single items separately into the equations disregards the fact that the 
instruments of initiative and referendum have different rationales. The referendum is a strong 
restriction for the politicians or the legislature to act in their personal interest (see Feld and 
Kirchgässner, 2000). As a consequence, tax revenues might be spent more in accordance with 
the preferences of the taxpayers, restricting a possible politicians’ cartel. Furthermore, the 
referendum possibility leads the politicians to adopt a relatively consensual position in order 
to avoid policy rejections. Contrary to a referendum, with an initiative taxpayers are in the 
position of “agenda setters” (see Feld and Kirchgässner, 2000). It allows submitting undesired 
issues to the voters. An initiative helps express the taxpayers’ preferences on what should be 
done with the taxes and thus opens the door for new and innovative ideas. As indexes do not 
tell as much as a single instrument, in Eq. 12a and 12b we include a dummy on legislative 
                                                 
10 For the theory of aspiration see e.g., Frank, 1941; Simon, 1955;  Siegel, 1957)   19
referenda (mandatory) and the degree of signature requirements for legislative initiatives to 
assess  the  (marginal)  impact  of  both  instruments  (see  Table  A3  in  the  Appendix)
11. 
Furthermore, such a procedure reduces the problems of multicorrelation as the correlation 
between the subindex for legislative referendum and legislative initiative is very high (0.772). 
For both data sets the coefficient of the dummy LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM is highly 
significant with high marginal effects (9.7 percentage points in WVS, 6.8 in the ISSP data 
set). Similarly, higher signature requirements lead to a lower tax morale, but without being 
statistically  significant.  The  mandatory  referendum  seems  to  be  a  stronger  instrument  to 
enhance tax morale than the initiative. A possible reason for the differences between both 
instruments might be that it entails less costs than an initiative to force a vote on a given issue. 
In  Switzerland  there  is  evidence  that  the  interest  of  the  political  elite  does  not  always 
correspond  to  taxpayers’  preferences.  Frey  and  Eichenberger  (1999,  p.  20)  report  an 
interesting  example  from  Switzerland  in  1992,  where  taxpayers  were  not  ready  to  pay 
additional expenses rejecting in an optional referendum the proposal to increase the salaries 
and the staff of Swiss Members of Parliament. In general, between 1848 and 1997 in 36% of 
the  316  referenda  voters  had  a  different  opinion  than  the  Parliament  (see  also  Frey  and 
Eichenberger, 1999).  
In order to account for different cultural backgrounds and thus to better isolate the 
institutional  effect  from  the  cultural  one,  a  language  dummy  variable  (German  speaking 
individuals) has been integrated
12. Culture can be seen as a kind of language, based on rule 
systems, as ideas, values, and internal institutions as customs and conventions (see Heinrich et 
al., 1999). An essential question in the tax compliance context is whether culture influences 
co-operation, solidarity, or in our analysis tax morale. We can see in the last equation that the 
coefficients for the direct democratic participation rights remain highly significant. On the 
other hand, the language factor does not show a statistically significant effect on tax morale. 




                                                 
11  The  dummy  of  the  legislative  referendum  indicates  whether  a  canton  has  the  possibility  of  a  legislative 
referendum (mandatory). The signature requirement for legislative initiatives is the major parameter in this form 
of direct democracy and an indicator of the costs of using the initiative instrument. The higher the number of 
signatures, the more difficult and costly it is to realise the initiative. This was measured as a relative value 
(signature requirements/total number of voters). 
12 In order to save degrees of freedom, only the index of direct democracy has been integrated the in the WVS 
estimation and not both single direct democratic participation instruments as in the estimation with the ISSP data 
set which covers more observations at the cantonal level.    20
Table 4 Sensitivity analysis for the effects of direct democracy on tax morale (WVS 1996) 
￿
WVS 1996                   
weighted ordered probit             
Dependent variable: tax morale             
Independent variables  8a  9a  10a  11a  12a  13a 
a) Deterrence Factors             
FINE RATE  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.002* 
  (-0.001)  (-0.001)  (-0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.002*  0.002**  0.002*  -0.5E-03  0.002**  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
b) Tax Rate             
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE  -0.008  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007 
  (-0.003)  (-0.003)  (-0.003)  (-0.003)  (-0.003)  (-0.003) 
c) Direct Democracy             
INDEX DIRECT DEMOCRACY            0.161*** 
            (0.064) 
Subindices              
CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE  0.148***           
  (0.059)           
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE    0.154***         
    (0.061)         
LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM      0.099***       
      (0.040)       
FINANCIAL REFERENDUM        0.157***     
        (0.062)     
Single Instruments             
DUMMY LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM          0.244***   
          (0.097)   
SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT          -0.067   
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE          (-0.026)   
             
d) Trust             
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT  0.179***  0.180***  0.158***  0.168***  0.152***  0.169*** 
  (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.063)  (0.067)  (0.060)  (0.067) 
e) Language             
GERMAN SPEAKING            0.081 
            (0.032) 
f) Further variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
             
                    
Notes: Marginal effects for the highest tax morale score are given in parentheses. Dependent variable: 
tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, FULL TIME 







Table 5 Sensitivity analysis for the effects of direct democracy on tax morale (ISSP 1999) 
￿
ISSP 1999                   
weighted ordered probit             
Dependent variable: tax morale             
Independent variables  8b  9b  10b  11b  12b  13b 
a) Deterrence Factors             
FINE RATE  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.50E-03  0.42E-03 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.4E-03  0.4E-03  0.31E-03  -0.001  0.001  0.17E-03 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
b) Tax Rate             
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE  -0.018  -0.017  -0.004  -0.013  -0.20E-03  -0.001 
  (-0.005)  (-0.005)  (-0.005)  (-0.004)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
c) Direct Democracy             
Subindices              
CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE  0.051*           
  (0.015)           
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE    0.064**         
    (0.018)         
LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM      0.088***       
      (0.026)       
FINANCIAL REFERENDUM        0.090***     
        (0.026)     
Single Instruments             
DUMMY LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM          0.237***  0.226*** 
          (0.068)  (0.065) 
SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT          -0.043  -0.002 
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE          (-0.012)  (-0.001) 
             
d) Trust             
TRUST IN COURT AND LEGAL   0.095***  0.096***  0.097***  0.084***  0.094***  0.090*** 
SYSTEM  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.027)   
             
e) Language             
GERMAN SPEAKING            0.168 
            (0.049) 
             
f) Further variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
                    
Notes: Marginal effects for the highest tax morale score are given in parentheses. Dependent variable: tax morale on a four 
point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, FRENCH AND ITALIAN 









3.2.3. Local autonomy 
 
Federalism is a second important political institution in Switzerland. Table 6 and 7 
present  the  estimations.  First  we  integrate  the  variable  LOCAL  AUTONOMY  into  the 
equation without the variables TRUST IN GOVERNMENT (COURT AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM) and INDEX OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY. The coefficients show in both data sets 
a statistically significant positive effect on tax morale. The share of individuals indicating the 
highest tax morale increases in the WVS data set (ISSP) by 6.2 (5.4) percentage points with 
an increase in one index point of autonomy. The introduction of the trust variables does not 
affect the size and the significance of the variable. The last equation jointly includes local 
autonomy and direct democracy. Both determinants help citizens express their demands and 
control  the  government.  As  we  can  see,  the  coefficient  for  local  autonomy  loses  its 
significance and its size in the WVS, while the direct democracy index remains robust. On the 
other hand, the ISSP data indicates that the variable LOCAL AUTONOMY remains highly 
significant with a slightly lower coefficient and a smaller marginal effect. On the other hand, 
the index of direct democracy is still significant but at a lower significance level and with 
lower coefficient and marginal effect values.  
Frey  and  Stutzer  (2000)  argue  that  direct  democracy  and  local  autonomy  are 
interdependent. Direct democracy and federal structures foster each other because individuals 
are interested in a strong federalism. They are bearing the costs and benefits of governments’ 
activities, which help taxpayers get a better identification. In general, Feld and Kirchgässner 
(2001) point out that: “The more important regional and local jurisdictions are in the internal 
organization  of  a  nation-state,  the  more  important  is  the  question  of  the  proper  decision-
making procedures at the different government levels. The assignment of competencies to 
different  government  levels  is  linked  to  decision-making  procedures”  (p.  333).  The  two 
variables are significantly correlated at the 0.01 level (WVS, r = 0.392; ISSP, r = 0.574). 
Thus, it is difficult to separate the effects of the two variables in one model.  
In  general  it  could  be  criticised  that  including  aggregated  variables  as  direct 
democracy or local autonomy might produce downward biased standard errors (see, e.g., Frey 
and Stutzer, 2000). To check whether a correction regarding the standard errors has an effect 
on  the  significance  level  of  the  aggregated  variables,  we  present  in  Table  A3  and  A4  a 
summary of the main estimations with standard errors adjusted to clustering in 20 cantons 
(WVS),  respectively  26  cantons  (ISSP).  Table  A3  and  A4  indicate  that  no  changes  are   23
observable regarding our main aggregated variables: direct democracy and federalism have a 
significant positive effect on tax morale.  
Table 6 Tax morale and local autonomy (WVS 1996) 
￿
WVS 1996                   
weighted ordered probit  Eq. 5a    Eq. 6a    Eq. 7a   
Dependent variable: tax morale             
Independent variables  Coeff.  Marg.  Coeff.  Marg.  Coeff.  Marg. 
a) Deterrence Factors             
FINE RATE  -0.001  0.000  -0.39E-03  0.000  -0.002  -0.001 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.002**  0.001  0.002**  0.001  0.001**  0.001 
             
b) Tax Rate             
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE  -0.009*  -0.003  -0.008  -0.003  -0.007  -0.003 
             
c) Local Autonomy             
INDEX LOCAL AUTONOMY  0.156**  0.062  0.165***  0.066  0.015  0.006 
             
d) Trust             
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT      0.165***  0.066  0.169***  0.067 
             
e) Direct Democracy             
INDEX DIRECT DEMOCRACY          0.180***  0.072 
             
f) Further variables  yes    yes    yes   
             
Number of observations  910    879    879   
Prob(LM-statistic)  0.000     0.000     0.000    
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, 
FULL TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.    24
￿
Table 7 Tax morale and local autonomy (ISSP 1999) 
￿
ISSP 1999                   
weighted ordered probit  Eq. 5b    Eq. 6b    Eq. 7b   
Dependent variable: tax morale             
Independent variables  Coeff.  Marg.  Coeff.  Marg.  Coeff.  Marg. 
a) Deterrence Factors             
FINE RATE  0.85E-04  0.000  0.28E-03  0.000  -0.10E-03  0.000 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.001  0.000  0.24E-03  0.000  -0.34E-04  0.000 
             
b) Tax Rate             
INDIVIDUAL  INCOME TAX RATE  -0.006  -0.002  -0.005  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
             
c) Local Autonomy             
INDEX LOCAL AUTONOMY  0.187***  0.054  0.197***  0.057  0.142**  0.041 
             
d) Trust             
TRUST IN COURT AND THE LEGAL       0.094***  0.027  0.093***  0.027 
SYSTEM             
             
e) Direct Democracy             
INDEX DIRECT DEMOCRACY          0.061*  0.018 
             
f) Further variables  yes    yes    yes   
             
Number of observations  1114    1068    1068   
Prob(LM-statistic)  0.000     0.000     0.000    
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MAN, SINGLE, 






The basic intention of this paper is to analyse how formal and informal institutions 
affect tax morale. Empirical and experimental findings in the tax compliance literature have 
shown  that  the  standard  model  of  tax  evasion  based  on  an  expected  utility  maximisation 
approach predicts a higher degree of tax evasion than observed. Thus, the tax compliance 
puzzle is why people pay taxes. It has been argued that tax morale might explain such a high 
compliance. However, hardly any empirical study has analysed what shapes tax morale. This 
paper tries to fill out this gap analysing tax morale as dependent variables working with two 
different data sets from Switzerland: the WVS and the ISSP. Special attention has been given   25
to two constitutional determinants, which are rarely analysed in the empirical tax compliance 
literature: direct democracy and local autonomy. Institutions that respect the preferences of 
the citizens will have more support by the people than a state that acts as a Leviathan, and 
thus  enhance  tax  morale.  Both  instruments  help  spend  taxes  according  to  the  citizens’ 
preferences,  which  increases  the  motivation  to pay the taxes. The results obtained in this 
paper with tax morale as a dependent variable are fully in line with previous studies, which 
analysed the impact of direct democracy on tax evasion in Switzerland (see Frey and Feld, 
2002; Feld and Frey, 2002b; Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne, 1989; Pommerehne and 
Weck-Hannemann,  1996;  and  Frey,  1997).  Furthermore,  our  study  shows  that  trust  in 
government and trust in the court and the legal system correlates with a higher tax morale.  
With these two data sets, strong evidence has been found that formal and informal 
institutions significantly influence tax morale. This effect tends to persist even after 
controlling for the basic variables from the traditional tax evasion models (probability of 
detection, the fine for tax evasion and individuals’ tax rates) and socio-demographic and 
socio-economic factors (age, income, education, gender, marital status, employment status) 
and doing sensitivity tests. In line with a recent empirical study done by Feld and Frey 
(2002b) in Switzerland, in pooled cross section time series estimations for Swiss cantons the 
traditional deterrence factors are not performing in a satisfactory way. In many estimations 
done with our two data sets the coefficients were not significant.    26
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Table A1Direct democratic rights in Swiss cantons 
 










































   
Local 
Autonomy 
Aargau  5.67  5.67  6  4.5  5.46  1  0.88  4.9 
Appenzell I. Rh.  6  6  6  3  5.25  1  0.00  5 
Appenzell A. Rh.  6  6  6  4  5.5  1  0.00  5.8 
Bern  2.67  2.67  3.67  5  3.5  0  2.22  4.6 
Basel-Landschaft  6  6  6  4.75  5.69  1  0.87  4.3 
Basel-Stadt  4.67  4.67  4  4.25  4.4  0  3.20  5.5 
Fribourg  2.67  2.67  2.33  2  2.42  0  3.98  4.2 
Genève  2  2  2  1  1.75  0  4.84  3.2 
Glarus  6  6  6  4  5.5  1  0.00  5.6 
Graubünden  4  5  6  4  4.75  1  2.42  5.8 
Jura  4.67  4.67  3  2.5  3.71  0  3.92  4 
Luzern  4.67  5.33  3.67  4.25  4.48  0  1.77  4.1 
Neuchâtel  2.67  2.67  1.67  1.5  2.13  0  5.86  3.7 
Nidwalden  2.67  6  6  5  4.92  1  0.00  5.5 
Obwalden  5.33  6  6  5  5.58  1  0.00  6 
Sankt Gallen  3.33  4  3  3.25  3.4  0  1.44  4.9 
Schaffhausen  5.33  5.33  5.17  4.5  5.08  1  2.09  6.1 
Solothurn  5.33  5.33  6  5  5.42  1  1.84  4.9 
Schwyz  5.33  5.33  4.67  4.38  4.93  1  2.50  4.6 
Thurgau  3.67  3.67  4.33  4.5  4.04  0  2.93  5.9 
Ticino  1.33  2.67  1.67  2.75  2.1  0  3.66  4.3 
Uri  5.67  5.67  5.33  5  5.42  1  1.19  5.4 
Vaud  2.33  2.33  2  3  2.42  0  3.37  4.7 
Valais  3  3.67  6  1  3.42  0  2.28  5.5 
Zug  5  5  3.67  4  4.42  0  3.30  6 
Zürich  3.33  3.33  6  4  4.17  1  1.31  5.4 
Source:  Index  Direct  Democracy,  Frey  and  Stutzer  (2000,  p.  937);  Dummy  Legislative  Referendum  and 
Signature Requirement Legislative Initiative, Stutzer (1999, pp. 18-19). Local Autonomy, Ladner (1994), Frey 
and Stutzer (1999, p. 27). See also Trechsel and Serdült (1999).  
Notes: 
(a) Relative value (signature requirements/total number of voters). The cantons which have or had until 
recently  the  ‘Landsgemeinde’  (town  meeting)  (Appenzell  I.  Rh.,  Obwalden,  Glarus,  Appenzell  A.  Rh.  and 
Nidwalden), have been coded with the value 1 for the dummy of legislative referendum and the value 0 for the 






Table A2 Derivation of variables WVS 
 
Variable  Derivation 






The ten-point scale has been recoded into a four-point scale, with the value 4 
standing for “never justifiable”. 4-10 has been integrated in group 1 because of a 
lack of variance.  
Fine Rate  Standard legal fine (in percent) as a multiple of the evaded tax amount based on 
questionnaire data of Frey and Feld (2002) and Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) 
Probability of Detection  Number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰) based on questionnaire data of Frey 
and Feld (2002) and Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b). 
Individual Tax Rate  Own calculations based on the average weighted value (in percentage) using the 
WVS income groups. From the tax table (Steuerbelastung in der Schweiz 1996, 
p. 48) the value closest to the average found in the WVS groups is used, groups 
6 and 7 being pooled. For the highest value an average income of 300’000 Swiss 
francs has been assumed (midpoint). For simplicity, no differentiation between 
singles and married people has been made, working with the individual tax rate 
table for singles.   
Trust in Government  Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in your 
capital: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all) 
Church Attendance  Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend 
religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a 
month, only on special holydays, once a year, less often, never practically never. 
(7= more than once a week to 1=never, practically never) 
Income  Here is a scale of incomes (1-10). We would like to know in what group your 
household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come 
in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and 
other deductions.  
1.  Less then 20’000 Swiss Francs 
2.  20’000-26’999 
3.  27’000-31’999 
4.  32’000-37’999 
5.  38’000-44’999 
6.  45’000-51’999 
7.  52’000-59’999 
8.  60’000-69’999 
9.  70’000-89’999 
10.  More than 90’000 
Education  What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 
1.  Never went to school 
2.  Incomplete primary school 
3.  Primary school (up to 12 years of age) 
4.  Apprenticeship 
5.  Lower secondary school (up to 16 years of age) 
6.  Secondary school without diploma (16-19 years) 
7.  Technical school 
8.  Secondary school with diploma 
9.  University or Federal Polytechnical School without degree 
10.  University or Federal Polytechnical School with degree 
Individual Financial 
Satisfaction 
How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (scale 1 = 
dissatisfied to 10=satisfied) 




Table A3Derivation of variables ISSP 
 
Variable  Derivation 
Tax Morale (dependent 
variable) 
Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if  a taxpayer does not report all of his or 
her income in order to pay less income taxes? (1. not wrong, 2. a bit wrong, 3. 
wrong,  4. seriously wrong). 
Trust in Court an the Legal 
System 
How much confidence do you have in courts and the legal system (5=complete 
confidence to 1=no confidence at all) 
Fine Rate  Standard legal fine (in percent) as a multiple of the evaded tax amount based on 
questionnaire data of Frey and Feld (2002) and Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) 
Probability of Detection  Number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰) based on questionnaire data of Frey 
and Feld (2002) and Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b) 
Individual Tax Rate  Own calculations based on the average weighted value (in percentage) working 
with  the  income  information  done  by  the  ISSP.  From  the  tax  table 
(Steuerbelastung  in  der  Schweiz  1999,  p.  48)    the  value  closest to the ISSP 
income  values  (midpoint)  is  used.  For  simplicity,  no  differentiation  between 
singles and married people has been made, working with the individual tax rate 
table for singles.   
Church Attendance  How often do you take part in the activities or organisations of a church or a place of 
worship, other than attending services? Never (1), less than once a year, about once or 
twice a year, several times a year, about once a month, 2-3 times a month, nearly every 
week, every week, several times a week (9) 
Income  Monthly earnings from employment in Swiss francs (midpoints) 
Education  What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 
1.  Incomplete primary school 
2.  Primary school (up to 12 years of age) 
3.  Incomplete secondary 
4.  Secondary completed 
5.  Incomplete + complete semi-higher qualification, incomplete 
university, others 
6.  University completed 





WVS 1996           
weighted ordered probit           
Dependent variable: tax morale           
Independent variables  14a  15a  16a  17a  18a 
a) Deterrence Factors           
FINE RATE  -0.002**  -0.002*  -0.001*  -0.39E-03  -0.002* 
  (-2.206)  (-1.680)  (-1.943)  (0.810)  (-1.794) 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001 
  (0.749)  (0.631)  (1.294)  (1.146)  (0.773) 
b) Tax Rate           
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE  -0.007*  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008*  -0.007* 
  (-1.714)  (-1.646)  (-1.512)  (-1.909)  (-1.710) 
c) Institutions           
INDEX DIRECT DEMOCRACY  0.184***  0.161***      0.180*** 
  (3.929)  (3.036)      (3.371) 
Single Instruments           
DUMMY LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM      0.244***     
      (2.638)     
SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT      -0.067     
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE      (-1.315)     
          
INDEX LOCAL AUTONOMY        0.165  0.015 
       (1.611)  (0.092) 
d) Trust           
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT  0.170***  0.169***  0.152***  0.165***  0.169*** 
 (3.125)  (3.153)  (2.976)  (3.262)  (3.159) 
e) Language           
GERMAN SPEAKING    0.081       
   (0.453)       
          
f) Further variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
          
          
Notes: z-values are given in parentheses. Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference 
group  are  AGE  16-29,  MAN,  SINGLE,  FULL  TIME  EMPLOYED,  FRENCH  AND  ITALIAN  SPEAKING. 












Table A5 Determinants of tax morale ISSP 1999 (std. err. adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons) 
￿
ISSP 1999           
weighted ordered probit           
Dependent variable: tax morale           
Independent variables  14b  15b  16b  17b  18b 
a) Deterrence Factors           
FINE RATE  -0.001  -0.50E-03  -0.42E-03  0.28E-03  -0.15E-03 
  (-0.686)  (-0.570)  (-0.487)  (0.255)  (-0.201) 
AUDIT PROBABILITY  -0.47E-04  0.001  0.17E-03  0.24E-03  0.49E-03 
  (-0.047)  (0.671)  (0.162)  (0.253)  (0.559) 
b) Tax Rate           
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE  -0.010  -0.20E-03  -0.001  -0.005  0.004 
  (-0.461)  (-0.010)  (-0.034)  (-0.212)  (0.184) 
c) Institutions           
INDEX DIRECT DEMOCRACY  0.104***        
  (2.736)        
Single Instruments           
DUMMY LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM    0.237***  0.226**    0.219** 
    (2.674)  (2.398)    (2.533) 
SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT    -0.043  -0.002    -0.015 
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE    (-0.945)  (-0.028)    (-0.339) 
          
INDEX LOCAL AUTONOMY        0.197***  0.111* 
       (2.742)  (1.833) 
d) Trust           
TRUST IN COURT AND LEGAL   0.093***  0.094***  0.090***  0.094***  0.096*** 
SYSTEM  (3.159)  (3.261)  (2.996)  (3.190)  (3.311) 
           
e) Language           
GERMAN SPEAKING      0.168     
     (1.165)    
           
f) Further variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
          
Notes: z-values are given in parentheses. Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference 
group  are  AGE  16-29,  MAN,  SINGLE,  FULL  TIME  EMPLOYED,  FRENCH  AND  ITALIAN  SPEAKING. 
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